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Contract standardisation serves many important functions in the sovereign debt market: among these, it saves time and money in preparing documents and endows widely-used terms with a shared public meaning, which in turn saves investors the costs of acquiring information, facilitates secondary market trading and reduces the scope for mistakes in the judicial interpretation of contract terms. Sovereign debt issuers and investors claim to value standardisation and list it as an important contractual objective. Issuers generally insist that their bond contracts are standard and reflect market practice. Variations from past practice and market norm must be explained in disclosure documents and through market outreach. Standardisation is not just part of the fabric of market expectations: international policy initiatives to prevent and manage financial crises rest on the assumption that sovereign debt contracts follow a generally accepted standard. Such initiatives would make no sense in the absence of standardisation.
In fact, sovereign bond contracts are not nearly as standardised as market participants and policy makers seem to suggest. It is common to see a handful of negotiated terms embedded in a mish-mash of different generation industry models, sprinkled with bits of creative expression that no one can explain, usually attributed to some long-forgotten lawyers. At least some of the variation appears to be deliberate. However, to the extent that it is inadvertent, variation can be costly. For example, it can make contracts internally inconsistent, vulnerable to opportunistic lawsuits and errors of judicial interpretation. Variation could also make debt instruments less liquid, especially during periods of market stress.
The problem of inadvertent variation would diminish substantially if sovereign debt markets were to adopt a more centralised, modular approach to contracting, whereby a subset of widely-used non-financial terms would be produced by an authoritative third party (a public, private, or public-private body) and incorporated by reference in individual transactions. Debtors and creditors would have to add party-and transaction-specific terms, and could still depart from centrally-produced default terms. However, any variation would be in a separate document, which would make it salient and thus easier to detect and evaluate than under the prevailing contract production regime. Market participants and the courts could rest assured that the terms purporting to be standard were in fact standard and that any departures from the standard were intentional and meaningful. Centralised production of standard terms would maximise the advantages of standardisation, amplify the signalling capacity of bespoke terms, facilitate the diffusion of optimal contract innovations across the sovereign debt market and reduce the legacy stock problem that has 1 Professor, Georgetown Law and non-resident senior fellow at the Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics. I am grateful to the participants in the conference at the ECB and the University of Virginia Law School, and to Mitu Gulati, Angel Ubide, and Pierre Verdier for insights that contributed to this essay, and to Sebastian Röing for research assistance. stumped policy makers and market participants 2 . Terms that have lost relevance through boilerplate iteration over time would be revised or culled more readily than they are today. 3 Centralised and modular contracting is not new in finance. Versions of the practice just described, where an industry group supplies core terms for contracts spanning an entire market, exist in foreign exchange and derivatives markets, as well as in trade finance. 4 More distant analogues, where certain default terms are supplied by statute or treaty, are also common, especially in civil law systems. 5 The Uniform Commercial Code, adopted by US states, and the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods are among the examples from common-law jurisdictions. Most industry and statutory models of standardisation share three key features: central production of some terms, modularity (enabling combinations of customised and standard terms, selected from a menu) 6 and a commitment to revision.
In many ways, sovereign bonds are ideal candidates for centrally produced modular contracts. They tend to be actively traded, serve as price benchmarks for other borrowers and as collateral for other financial products, and are often favoured by regulated financial firms. Minimising information and transaction costs and errors of interpretation is especially important in such a market.
The transition would not require a radical departure from current contracting practice. Sovereign debt contracting already has elements of modularity and centralisation. For instance, non-financial terms of domestic government debt are typically found in regulations; financial terms are announced at transaction time. External government debt commonly follows the practice of issuing multiple series of bonds with different financial terms pursuant to a single indenture or fiscal agency agreement, for example, under medium-term note (MTN) programmes and "shelf" registration filings with securities regulators. government debt management fora, financial industry associations and ad hoc groups of senior policy officials already issue non-binding guidance on sovereign debt contracts, invest in diffusing this guidance and coordinate ongoing reforms.
For all these reasons, sovereign debt markets could plausibly achieve a higher degree of standardisation by switching to robustly centralised, modular contract production. Such reform would bring new political economy challenges. Sovereigns, 2 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Progress Report on Inclusion of Enhanced Contractual Provisions in International Sovereign Bond Contracts (September 2015) , available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2015/091715.pdf, pp. 9-10. along with their public and private creditors, would have to agree on a body to draft and periodically update standard terms, coordinate their adoption, maybe even to issue authoritative interpretations. Sovereign governments, foreign and domestic creditors, civil society and international institutions would all have a stake in the outcome of this body's work. If the centrally produced terms were to function as a strong default, their political salience would be high, raising barriers to coordination. Since sovereign debt markets are hierarchical and segmented both among issuers and investors, status and representation concerns would loom large. Finally, there would certainly be constituencies against change in any form, including lawyers and bankers in New York and London, who may have to give up influence and at least a portion of their fees, as well as those issuers and investors who would prefer to drown their idiosyncratic terms and arbitrage opportunities in the noise of apparently unintentional variation.
Despite these caveats, moving to more robust standardisation makes sense for the foreign sovereign debt market, if not for sovereign debt in general. The remainder of this essay elaborates the argument. Part I defines standardisation and considers its benefits and costs in financial contracts. Part II discusses sovereign debt contract production, reform initiatives and the controversy over variation in the pari passu clause, which featured in recent sovereign debt litigation. Part III touches on statutory and judicial solutions to the problem of incomplete standardisation and elaborates an alternative solution, featuring centralised production of terms. Part IV outlines what centralised and modular contracts might look like in foreign sovereign debt and raises possible objections to such a contracting regime. I conclude by identifying the implications for research and policy.
1
Why standardise?
You know a term is standard when
Classic law texts on contract standardisation treat standard ("boilerplate") terms as if they were identical within the standard: at the extreme, comprising the same words in the same order, with the same punctuation. 7 If the assumption is essentially correct, then even small variations in language must be presumed to be intentional and treated as meaningful by the parties and the courts. 8 On the other hand, if the concept of "standard" allows some scope for variation without necessarily altering the effect of the contract term -perhaps as a matter of individual or firm drafting style, or local idiomatic usage -then the parties and the courts would have to first decide whether the words before them mean to convey a distinct meaning or merely express the same thing differently.
Standard contracts, like standard terms, can also range from identical to broadly similar, or "of the same type." For example, a standard consumer loan agreement might be entirely pre-printed, with only a few blanks to be completed at the closing by a bank clerk. A standard sovereign or corporate bond might contain a customary set of terms arranged in the usual order; however, not all terms are found in all bond contracts, some terms might come in several distinct yet standard "flavours," while other term types might permit a measure of variation within an accepted range. Thus two bonds might contain very different negative pledge clauses, yet both clauses would be considered standard -provided the standard comprises several alternatives, or permits variation -and, as a consequence, the bonds would be considered standard as well.
Some terms or variations are found only in bonds of a particular credit quality, or in a certain geographic region. The resulting contract is standard for its type, for example, an emerging market sovereign bond issued in London, or a Latin American corporate bond issued in New York.
Investors might take a checklist approach to contract analysis, asking simply whether a term type is present in the contract: is there a negative pledge clause? 9 They might also ask whether the term itself is "standard," meaning whether it follows one of the accepted conventions for the relevant market. If enough of the customary terms are present and standard, the contract would be treated as standard. Only rarely would the investor parse the wording of a term to assess whether it departs from the standard and thus represents a risk or an arbitrage opportunity.
Benefits
Standard-form contracts are ubiquitous; their advantages in lowering transaction costs and conveying information are well-rehearsed. 10 These advantages are especially pronounced in financial contracts among sophisticated parties. This subsection provides a very brief summary.
Standardised contracts are quicker and easier to produce. Reproducing and customising standard forms saves research, drafting and negotiation costs over generating text from scratch. Contract counterparties may pay less to service providers and middlemen, such as lawyers and investment bankers arranging the transaction. Even if it did not produce cost savings overall, standardisation can help deploy the resources allocated to contract production more efficiently. This is because the time and energy that might have been spent drafting and analysing 9 For example, Bloomberg offers a bond-level covenant checklist as part of its fixed-income portfolio management toolkit. If a bond contains one of the listed covenants, the word "Yes" appears opposite the covenant name. The screen contains no further information on the nature and content of the covenant, which only makes sense if all covenants that go by the same name have the same substantive effect. 10 See, for example, Klausner and Kahan, supra footnote 7, for a good overview.
frequently-used terms can now be devoted to novel and transaction-specific challenges. As an additional benefit, compressing the transaction preparation period allows issuers and investors to take advantage of time-sensitive market opportunities.
Widespread, repeated use imbues standard terms with a meaning shared among the relevant market participants. This has multiple important implications for financial contracts. Shared meaning reduces the cost of information acquisition in secondary market trading. Buyers and sellers who know that a bond contract is standard do not need to research its meaning before deciding whether to trade it. Conversely, variation becomes more salient against a background of standard terms. The combination of a strong standard and deliberate, easily discernible variation in contract terms makes it easier to convey information -for example, to signal willingness or ability to repay.
Standard terms with shared meaning can become important tools in coordinating market-wide response to shocks and other contingencies. Contracts can effectively codify market practices and spur the development of institutional infrastructure, for example, to guide the parties through early termination and substitute performance, procedures for interest rate and exchange rate calculation, as well as notice, payment and settlement mechanics. If a dispute over the meaning of a standard term goes to court, the existence of a shared meaning can save adjudication costs and help avoid interpretation error. Judges can (and generally must) presume that the parties used standard terms in standard ways, which are easier to access than the parties' idiosyncratic, subjective meanings. 11
Costs
The downsides of standardisation, like its advantages, are related to its coordination properties. For example, if all contracts provide for the same response to counterparty financial distress, or to drastic exchange rate depreciation, standardform contracts can amplify financial contagion: all market participants might rush to sell at the same time. 12 Furthermore, standardisation can raise the cost of individual judicial errors even if it were to reduce the overall incidence of such errors. When a standard term is misunderstood and misapplied by a court, the immediate effect is market-wide, potentially triggering a different form of contagion. trigger a market shock. On the other hand, standard terms can become selfperpetuating and impede the very sort of innovation that might avoid or correct judicial mistakes, or improve procedures to deal with crises.
A host of collective action problems may stand in the way of changing standard terms for the better. A new term might be costly to design but easy to replicate, dissuading potential first movers from investing resources they would find hard to recoup. Debtors may resist deviating from the standard for fear of sending a negative signal to the market. 14 A novel term, even one designed to correct an earlier judicial misunderstanding, can be misconstrued by a court; in any event, its meaning may not be settled for some time. 15 A contract containing the new term may be less liquid for as long as traders are unsure of its meaning, or how it fits into the institutional ecosystem that developed around the old boilerplate. Debtors and creditors may also delegate the task of updating their standard-form contracts to outside law firms, which come with their own organisational barriers to innovation. 16
In sum, contract standardisation has many benefits, but also comes with costs, including a tendency to amplify contagion from interpretive and other shocks and to stunt optimal innovation. I consider these benefits and costs in the context of foreign sovereign bonds in Part II. Part of the challenge with these bonds is the apparent lack of consensus on the sort of standardisation that should prevail in any given case -identical words/identical effect, or different words/identical effect -and whether sovereign debtors, their creditors, their citizens and other stakeholders in fact understand and intend the type of standardisation they are getting. the contracting customs of its chosen law market. 17 New York and English law dominate this category and are the focus for the remainder of this essay; however, German, Japanese and Swiss law contracts, among others, have been important for some sovereigns.
New York and English law sovereign debt securities are issued under a contract that describes the relationship between the debtor and the securities holders, including the holders' rights vis-à-vis one another and the sovereign. This contract -a trust indenture (New York), a trust deed (London), or a fiscal agency agreementcontains the core non-financial debt terms and may append a form of the security or securities to be issued. It has become common for sovereign borrowers to issue multiple series of securities under a single trust document or fiscal agency agreement, which contemplates a range of financial terms to be spelled out in future supplemental agreements. Figure 1 illustrates:
Figure 1
Sovereign bond contract architecture
There is a modular, hub-and-spokes quality to this contract. Non-financial terms, which range from ministerial to substantively significant (notably including waiver of immunity, governing law, status, payment, events of default and modification procedures) are agreed with the sovereign's investment bankers and produced by outside counsel, all paid by the issuer. Although parts of the negotiation and drafting process have become compressed with the advent of word processing and other 17 The practice is not uniform. technologies, it entails substantial individual input and personal interaction, that is to say real people haggling over words. 18 Once settled, core non-financial terms stay unchanged for years, as the sovereign periodically sells securities with maturities between one and thirty years under the same contract. 19 On the other hand, transaction-specific terms, such as principal and interest, term structure, currency, indexation, and others that directly determine payments due under the contract, might change whenever the sovereign goes to market, while incorporating the core by reference. Normally, neither the core nor the transaction-specific terms are negotiated with individual primary market investors; however, investment bankers managing the offering are supposed to keep up with market sentiment and solicit investors' views to ensure a successful distribution. Potential future buyers of distressed bonds in the secondary market, who tend to be quite specialised and do not normally participate in primary offerings, have even fewer ways of conveying their contract preferences.
Core non-financial terms in sovereign debt contracts exhibit a remarkable degree of continuity on the one hand, with functionally similar terms and even some of the same words appearing in 19th, 20th and 21st century bonds. They exhibit an equally remarkable degree of variation among terms in contemporary contracts that purport to be functionally similar, if not identical.
A case study in variation: the pari passu clause
While there is no comprehensive study of non-financial term variation in sovereign bonds, some contract provisions have been the subject of exhaustive studies. Foremost among these is the pari passu (equal step) clause, typically found under the heading "Status," which has appeared with slight variations in sovereign bond contracts since at least the 19th century. The most prominent contemporary variations of the clause are set forth below:
• 
Figure 2
Pari passu clause variations Source: Weidemaier et al. 2013 Since the revival of the foreign sovereign bond market in the 1990s, a growing number of sovereigns had chosen the "payment" version of the clause (Version 2), which made them vulnerable to injunctions in the aftermath of the Peru and Argentina rulings. The classic Version 1 of the clause, which promised equal ranking without reference to payment, seemed insulated from enforcement injunctions until another US court, responding to a copycat complaint against Grenada in 2013, left open the possibility that even a simple promise to rank pari passu might be read as supporting an injunction. 23 More recently, researchers have identified a separate category of contracts (labelled Version 3 in the typology above), which on the one hand use the vulnerable "payment" wording, but also apparently allow the debtor to pass a mandatory domestic law preferring its other payment obligations. Ukraine enacted just such a law in 2015, in an attempt to neutralise its Version 3 pari passu clause. 24 Finally, there was a noticeable if small contingent of Version 4 clauses, which promised rateable payment in no uncertain terms. On the whole, the growing prevalence of Version 2 clauses, along with the many variations on the pari passu theme unearthed in the wake of recent lawsuits, has sown confusion about the nature and effect of standardisation in sovereign bond contracts and the precise nature and scope of the threat to the system from pari passu. 23 The court refused to dismiss the case and ordered it to proceed to trial on the assumption (albeit for the sake of argument) that Grenada's Version 1 clause was "similar" to Argentina's Version 2 clause, see Export-Import Bank of the Republic of China v. Grenada, Opinion and Order, 13 Civ. 1350 (HB) (SDNY) (19 August 2013), p. 5, see http://www.creditslips.org/files/grenada.districtcourtdecision081913.pdf. The case was settled without a definitive ruling on the meaning of Grenada's Version 1 clause. 24 No court has construed a Version 3 clause to date.
Beginning in 2012, an informal working group 25 of policy officials, debt managers, market participants, lawyers and academics considered options for revising the pari passu clause, as well as majority modification CACs, in foreign sovereign bonds. 26 The group's work culminated in the release of new model clauses by the International Capital Market Association (ICMA), endorsed by the Group of 20 and the IMF. 27 The new pari passu clause reads as follows:
• Version 5 (ICMA Clause)
The Notes are the direct, unconditional and unsecured obligations of the Issuer and rank and will rank pari passu, without preference among themselves, with all other unsecured External Indebtedness of the Issuer, from time to time outstanding, provided, however, that the Issuer shall have no obligation to effect equal or rateable payment(s) at any time with respect to any such other External Indebtedness and, in particular, shall have no obligation to pay other External Indebtedness at the same time or as a condition of paying sums due on the Notes and vice versa.
The new model clause, which reflected several rounds of consultation with market participants, combined the simple ranking formulation of the old pari passu clause (Version 1) with an express disavowal of the rateable payment interpretation that had supported injunctions against Argentina and Peru. The disavowal stripped pari passu of its recently-acquired powers; however, the range of sovereign misdeeds it proscribed was vanishingly narrow, most likely limited to domestic laws subordinating the creditors. 28
2.4
The Un-Boilerplate
The reformulated pari passu clause was incorporated in ICMA's Primary Market Handbook, a guidance document addressed to its membership, which includes most major financial market participants, including issuers, buy-side and sell-side investors. Although members are expected to follow the guidance, it is a relatively soft coordination device: the model clause language is seen as a public good; it is neither strictly mandatory, nor rigorously policed. 29 The IMF similarly does not mandate the inclusion of particular language in its sovereign members' contracts; it 25 The author of this essay participated in the working group. Nonetheless, the entire coordination effort that brought about Version 5 of the pari passu clause was premised on a high degree of contract standardisation. The goals of reducing uncertainty and containing the spillover effects of pari passu as an enforcement tool would hardly be advanced if sovereigns and their creditors all varied significantly from the model clause, leaving future courts to sort out the mix of common standard and idiosyncratic meaning they sought to convey. Yet variation is precisely what happened immediately following the release of ICMA's version of pari passu in August 2014. The examples below illustrate:
•
Ghana (September 2014, English law)
The Notes constitute direct, unconditional and … unsecured obligations of the Issuer and … rank and will rank pari passu, without any preference among themselves and with all other present and future unsecured and unsubordinated obligations of the Issuer, save only for such obligations as may be preferred by mandatory provisions of applicable law, provided, however, that the Issuer shall have no obligation to effect equal or rateable payment(s) at any time with respect to any such other unsecured and unsubordinated obligations of the Issuer and, in particular, shall have no obligation to pay other unsecured and unsubordinated obligations of the Issuer at the same time or as a condition of paying sums due on the Notes and vice versa.
Kazakhstan (November 2014, English law)
The Notes will at all times rank pari passu without preference among themselves and at least pari passu in right of payment, with all other unsecured External Indebtedness of the Issuer from time to time outstanding, provided, however, that the Issuer shall have no obligation to effect equal or rateable payment(s) at any time with respect to the Notes or any other External Indebtedness and, in particular, shall have no obligation to pay other External Indebtedness at the same time or as a condition of paying sums due on the Notes and vice versa.
Vietnam (November 2014, New York law)
The Notes shall at all times rank without any preference among themselves and equally with all other present and future unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness … provided, however, consistent with similar provisions in the Government's other External Indebtedness, that this provision shall not be construed so as to oblige the Government to effect equal or rateable payment ( oblige the Government to pay other External Indebtedness at the same time or as a condition of paying sums due on the Notes and vice versa.
Mexico (November 2014, New York law)
The debt securities rank and will rank without any preference among themselves and equally with all other unsubordinated public external indebtedness of Mexico. It is understood that this provision shall not be construed so as to require Mexico to make payments under the debt securities ratably with payments being made under any other public external indebtedness.
Each of the above "early adopter" clauses includes the central innovation of ICMA's model, the disavowal of rateable payment; each might be sensibly classified as a "Version 5" clause. However, Ghana combines the Version 5 disavowal with additional flexibility to enact domestic laws subordinating the bondholders, also in Version 3. Kazakhstan's Version 5 incorporates a reference to payment, echoing Version 2, which had prompted the latest contract reform effort. Vietnam's and Mexico's clause replaces the Latin "pari passu" with the English term "equally," and appears to address the disavowal of rateable payment to the courts ("shall not be construed"). Vietnam moreover tries to extend the disavowal to its outstanding debt, which did not explicitly reject the rateable payment meaning.
What to make of this variation? It is easy enough to find an explanation for each of the early adopter clauses: some lawyers combined ICMA's model with their clients' old boilerplate; others sought to reconcile the language drafted by ICMA's English lawyers with local market conventions, in effect proposing a distinct-but-consistent New York standard. 31 Some or all might have thought that their phrasing was more elegant, or did a better job of protecting their clients on the margins. In public, everyone claimed that their clause followed ICMA recommendations endorsed by the IMF and that any variation from the model was non-substantive. This was quite unsettling in the wake of recent sovereign debt lawsuits, which showed, if anything, that variation as such posed a risk. Reigning in variation that turned out to be problematic ex post was an important objective for the public-private collaboration that yielded ICMA's model pari passu clause.
Even if one found ICMA's model clunky, or worse, internally inconsistent for promising equal treatment except when it really mattered, the model had the advantage of industry and public sector backing, along with well-publicised, accessible drafter's intent. 32 Years from now, a court construing early variations on ICMA's model pari passu clause would be hard-pressed to conclude that any of them were non-substantive, a product of mindless copying. 33 After all, these had to be among the most carefully considered pari passu clauses of all time. been the focus of policy and market attention for three years leading up to their production. The lawyers, bankers and officials responsible for contract design either participated in working group efforts directly, engaged in consultations or were targeted in outreach efforts early on. As a result, a future court might well conclude that any early adopter who chose to depart from the model did so deliberately, to achieve an objective distinct from that of the model. If this were not the result debtors and creditors had intended, perhaps their lawyers did not do their jobs: variation might indicate a persistent agency problem. 34 An investor mindful of this prospect would see a wealth of arbitrage opportunities. 
Whither sovereign debt contracts?
The pari passu episode, which began with a Belgian court ruling against Peru and ended (for now) with the introduction of ICMA clauses, highlighted several features of contracting in the foreign sovereign debt market. First, the market has at least two distinct and widely used standards -English law and New York law -which claim to achieve the same goals with different combinations of words.
Second, each of the two standards permits a degree of variation, including borrowing from one another, which the drafters (rightly or wrongly) describe as non-substantive. Apparently routine departures from the standard are almost never tested in court; when they are, some pose a real risk of divergent interpretation and market disruption. The risk of disruption is highest when there is no compelling evidence of market usage to give a contract term contemporary meaning. 36 Doctrinally, it must mean something -in practice, it could mean anything. The "payment" version of the pari passu clause used by Peru and Argentina, which eminent lawyers had described as functionally equivalent to the "ranking" version, is a case in point.
The third feature of sovereign debt contracting is its apparent susceptibility to coordination by public and private actors. The committee was active between 1935 and 1939. It mobilised experts from the financial industry, lawyers, academics, and government officials, and produced a report recommending changes in sovereign debt documentation and practice. League of Nations Report of the Committee for the Study of International Loan Contracts, Geneva (1939) . 41 Knowing that a bond has a pari passu clause or a CAC is close to meaningless without knowing what kind of pari passu clause and what kind of CAC it contains.
occasions when contracts do change, the large stock of legacy bonds detracts from the benefits of innovation and creates opportunities for abuse. Paradoxically, policy interventions to reform sovereign bond contracts to limit the cost of financial crises appear to be premised on a far greater degree of standardisation than that which prevails in the market. In some cases, reform initiatives open the gates of innovation only to amplify the range of variation. 42
Two broad approaches have been proposed to deal with aspects of this problem in relation to sovereign debt. The first is a sovereign bankruptcy treaty, which would override a subset of sovereign bond contract terms in a crisis, and facilitate a restructuring. The treaty would have to reflect a global consensus on topics such as the meaning of equal treatment, and chart an intelligible a roadmap for restructuring. 43 It could be drafted to apply to the old contracts and deal with the problem of outstanding stock. At the other extreme, scholars have recently proposed giving judges the ability to declare a standard term meaningless when presented with compelling evidence that it has lost content from decades of rote repetition and random, acontextual variation. 44 This approach could also address the outstanding stock problem, albeit in a more limited, ad hoc fashion.
A third possibility might combine contract, statute and interpretation in a single institutional mechanism. The derivatives industry offers an example.
Contract as market
The global over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market is organised around a common contract produced and copyrighted by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), which underpins transactions referencing close to $500 trillion in notional amounts outstanding. 45 The ISDA master agreement functions as the hub for contract modules that, together with the master agreement, make up a derivatives contract. These include relationship-specific schedules and annexes negotiated among market participants. Product-specific sets of definitions correspond to particular types of transactions, such as interest rate, equity, or credit default swaps. Transaction-specific confirmations contain the relevant financial terms and incorporate the master agreement, the schedules and any other relevant parts of the contract apparatus by reference. In the example depicted in Figure 3 , the darklyshaded modules are transaction-specific, the medium-shaded module is relationshipspecific and the unshaded modules are standardised. (Table D5 ).
contract, enabling the counterparties to manage the relationship on a portfolio basis. 46
Figure 3
Derivatives contract architecture -an illustration Robust standardisation need not mean enforced uniformity. In Figure 3 , the parties are free to customise, so long as they do so in designated places -schedules and confirmations -which makes departures from the standard easier to spot and to analyse (and, as many commentators have noted, creates a barrier to variation). This structure also offers a partial solution to the outstanding stock problem in contract reform. The ISDA protocol process, first used in 1998 in as part of the transition to European economic and monetary union, gives members the option of acceding to a common document (a protocol) amending the master agreement. ISDA posts the protocol on its website and keeps a tally of adherents. Once two members have agreed to adhere to a common protocol, they have effectively amended their bilateral contracts to reflect the new terms. 47 Protocols reduce the need for bilateral negotiations, while reassuring market participants that the amendment in fact reflects industry preference. The solution to the stock problem is only partial, however, since when a new generation master agreement comes out, transactions governed by the old master agreement do not move to the new standard.
ISDA started out as a dealers' group in the 1980s, responding to demand for a common "vocabulary" in the transatlantic derivatives market. Although it is still 46 For an accessible overview of the ISDA contract architecture, see GuyLaine Charles, dominated by large financial institutions, the group has expanded its membership over time to include smaller funds, non-financial companies that use derivatives for risk management, and service providers. It has also sought to ensure that its contracts are enforceable around the world. ISDA's contracts are drafted by outside lawyers and in-house staff, working under the auspices of ISDA's documentation committee. The committee has thousands of members, although only a small subset participate actively. The same actors decide when a new master agreement or a new set of definitions might be needed to address a new product, responding to regulatory or market developments.
Since its inception, ISDA's work has expanded beyond contract drafting, to other areas of market practice, infrastructure, contract interpretation and private adjudication. Owing to the transnational reach of its contracts, their widespread adoption and high degree of standardisation, ISDA has become an indispensable intermediary between market participants, governments and international regulatory fora, projecting quasi-statutory power across its market. For example, in 2012, it worked with policy makers to minimise market disruption from the Greek debt restructuring, 48 while in 2014 and 2015, it published protocols to facilitate marketwide recognition of national laws for resolving large cross-border financial institutions, the result of intense collaboration with the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and regulators in major financial jurisdictions. 49 ISDA may be the best known instance of centralised, modular contracting in the financial industry, but it is not unique. For example, the foreign exchange market, with its daily turnover exceeding $5 trillion, 50 also uses a structure comprising standard-form master agreements, schedules, definitions and procedures, for foreign exchange and currency options transactions. The contracts are drafted by financial industry lawyers working with major foreign exchange market participants. In the United States, the drafters are part of the Financial Market Lawyers Group, sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The financial firms are represented by regional trade associations. 51 Like the push to standardise derivatives documentation, centralised production of standard-form foreign exchange contracts began in the 1980s; in both cases, standardisation gets much credit for the explosive market growth. In all these examples, financial industry members came together to produce a set of contract terms, which were then adopted wholesale, with limited variation, across the target market. The industry body took responsibility for the ongoing revision of standard terms and, increasingly, for their interpretation, which has elicited deference from the courts. 53 Over time, the industry body engaged in repeated instances of collaboration with governments and international organisations. Standard-form contracts became the basis for more elaborate interweaving and institutionalisation of policy and market practice even in the absence of treaties or statutes. The next part considers whether such a model might be suitable for the foreign sovereign debt market.
4
Who is afraid of sovereign boilerplate?
It would not take much to map ISDA's modular contract design illustrated in Figure 3 onto the existing foreign sovereign bond contract structure in Figure 1 . An industry body such as ICMA, perhaps in collaboration with a public institution such as the IMF or the FSB, and a rotating complement of sovereign debt managers and their lawyers, could draft the core non-financial terms of a New York trust indenture or English trust deed, including representations, covenants and events of default. The standard form might offer a menu of options for some terms, and make other terms optional. The draft would be released for a period of public consultation, including market and civil society outreach, on the administrative law model. At the conclusion of the consultation process, the result would be posted on a dedicated website along with any public comments received as part of the process. Sovereign borrowers would then incorporate the resulting terms by reference in future transactions, with customised terms confined to separate schedules.
The drafting group would meet regularly, say, twice a year, to consider recent developments and the potential need to revise or augment the standard form. Additional extraordinary meetings might be called in response to events that require prompt contract adaptation. Proposed revisions would be issued in a protocol, so that they might operate retroactively among any debtors and creditors who agreed to adhere to them. To minimise the legacy stock problem and the associated free-riding opportunities, the initial agreement could stipulate that protocols winning the adherence of a specified majority of outstanding bond holders affected by the proposed revision would bind all the remaining holders as well.
Such an approach to sovereign bond contracting would help ensure that standard portions of the contract are in fact standard and vetted by the relevant stakeholders, adding an element of public accountability that is mostly missing today. It would expressly acknowledge variations within the standard and highlight deviations from the standard. It would also facilitate ongoing collective revision of the terms, although it would also dampen individual initiative. To counter the tendency to boilerplate ossification and encourage culling, the drafting group could get standing authority to initiate revisions following regular reviews. Over time, the group may issue authoritative interpretations of its standard terms and articulate best practices with respect to disclosure, debtor-creditor engagement, and other process matters. 54
What is not to like in such an approach?
Although the centralised and modular contract production could have important advantages over the status quo, it would also pose new challenges. First, there is the matter of constituting the drafting group. It is implausible and undesirable for sovereign borrowers simply to delegate their debt contracts to a private industry body comprising large financial firms, or even to other governments. On the other hand, a drafting committee comprising all sovereign governments borrowing in the international markets under foreign law would be unwieldy. Rotating the membership in a way that ensures balanced representation from different regions and income groups may be acceptable to most sovereigns, but political sensitivities would remain.
Market participants would face representation challenges of their own: most existing industry bodies tend to skew in favour of the largest financial firms, which have more bargaining power and greater capacity to dedicate personnel to industry business. Distressed debt investors and others who normally eschew primary offerings, have no direct input in contract terms for the time being; market participants disagree on the extent to which secondary market prices convey such investors' views regarding contract terms. In the new drafting process, funds known for aggressive enforcement tactics would probably insist on being included; however, their contract preferences might well differ from those of the larger and more passive investors, who dominate primary markets today.
Second and related, decision-making rules would represent another hurdle: anything other than consensus would be controversial, but consensus might be unachievable. For example, the existence of a newly robust standard form contract, and the resulting presumption that any deviation from it is meaningful, could make deviation more costly. Countries that fear penalties for deviation might block agreement on a standard they dislike, raising the barrier to innovation higher for everyone. 54 The Third, the new contracts would have to account for existing and future market segmentation. For example, it is generally understood, though rarely acknowledged in public, that sovereigns with different credit ratings may have different foreign bond contracts. At the moment, much of this segmentation in contract drafting is relatively subtle and easy to hide in the din of apparently random variation. This also makes it easier for countries to change their contracts below the radar screen as they move up and down the credit ladder. A centralised drafting effort might produce different standards for different market segments, for example, by geographic region, credit quality, currency, or governing law, effectively forcing countries to classify themselves, a politically fraught outcome. It could also choose to issue a single standard and leave market segmentation to the schedules, where differences attributable to hierarchical factors could be muted more easily. An overly large menu of standards, or a single standard contemplating substantial variation in the schedules, would detract from the goal of robust standardisation, although neither is likely to be fatal to the overall effort.
Fourth, there is the matter of getting sovereign governments to follow through on their commitments to standardise. No one can force a country to adopt a particular contract term or contracting process, a challenge evident in the IMF's soft-touch approach to endorsing ICMA clauses and its predecessors. However, to the extent that new, centrally-produced terms would be accepted as the market standard, sovereigns might come under pressure from their investors to adopt such terms. Clearing and payment systems might also make access conditional on the adoption of the terms. Favourable treatment of centrally-produced contracts under bank, insurance, asset management and pension fund regulations would make them more liquid, creating additional adoption incentives.
Fifth, an attempt to centralise contract production could face opposition from the lawyers and bankers who currently produce sovereign bond contracts and are rather protective of their creative output. Even if such objections all amounted to rentseeking, they would be hard to ignore, especially since the new regime would want to harness these actors' expertise and documentation archives. On the bright side, lawyers active in the sovereign debt market are a relatively small community, comprising a few dozen lawyers, mostly within large firms. It is quite possible that all or most would find a role in negotiating relationship-and transaction-specific terms for existing clients and also participate in the group drafting effort. Finally, it is quite possible that the current, very incomplete standardisation in fact reflects the preferences of sovereign borrowers and their creditors. Most sovereigns issuing bonds abroad under foreign law may well prefer a world where contracts are ambiguous and noisy, even though they harbour latent risks of the sort that materialised in the case of Argentina. Modern-day reform initiatives to introduce CACs and change the pari passu clause tried hard to mute any signal from contract change. On the other hand, the average investor may prefer to trade contracts that are "standard enough," so that in most cases, careful analysis of the terms does not pay off. The small minority investing based on a thorough reading of the contract may be only too happy to keep the arbitrage opportunity to itself.
The foregoing objections are illustrative. The broad concern is that, in exchange for greater standardisation and more "statute-like" contracts, the sovereign debt market would find itself struggling with new and thorny political economy challenges. Centralised contract production would reallocate transactional and governance resources; it would empower some actors and constrain others. It is hard to tell in the abstract whether the trade-off would be an improvement on balance. That judgment would depend on specific institutional features of the new regime, and the resulting balance between stability and innovation, broad-based representation and individual initiative, among others.
Conclusions
Recent litigation and contract reform initiatives in the foreign sovereign debt market highlight the risks of haphazard, incomplete standardisation. While deliberate variation in contract terms can convey information, save borrowing costs and improve the parties' capacity to deal with contingencies, it is far from certain that existing variation is either deliberate or optimal.
Further research into the nature and extent of variation in sovereign bond terms beyond CACs and the pari passu clause would help diagnose the extent of the problem. It would also help identify how many distinct, more-or-less internally coherent documentation standards exist in the foreign sovereign debt market, so that parties' claims that their contracts are standard for one market segment and functionally equivalent to another, could be verified. Ascertaining the market standard or standards should inform the decision to proceed with more robust standardisation.
Pending further research, it makes sense to take sovereign borrowers and their creditors at their word: if robust standardisation is an important contracting objective, the sovereign bond market can get much closer to it with just a few relatively modest steps. Harnessing existing coordination mechanisms and contracting practices in the market, sovereigns and other stakeholders could, at a minimum, produce a standard set of core non-financial terms to be incorporated by reference in their transactions. Governance would present the biggest obstacle to standardisation on this model. Nonetheless, the centralised, modular contract alternative is worth a try given the risks embedded in the current regime and the difficulty of implementing statutory solutions. If debtors and creditors reject it, maybe they do not want to be standard after all. 
